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Abstract 
In metaphysics, fundamentality is a central theme 
involving debates on the nature of existents, as wholes. 
These debates are largely object-oriented in their 
standpoint and engage with composites or wholes 
through the mereological notion of compositionality. The 
ontological significance of the parts overrides that of 
wholes since the existence and identity of the latter are 
dependent on that of the former. Broadly, the candidates 
for fundamental entities are considered to be elementary 
particles of modern physics (since they appear to play the 
role of ultimate parts to all phenomena). The paper 
intends to show the inadequacy of the object-oriented 
notion of conditionality by pointing out that the parts and 
wholes possess varying conditions of existence. By 
alleging that only the parts are ontologically significant is 
to conflate such conditions and neglect the spectrum of 
conditions which exist in our world. A proposal for a 
revised notion of compositionality in terms of structural 
relatedness is also put forward. 
Keywords: Compositionality, Object-Oriented Metaphysics, 
Conditionality of Existence 
1. Introduction 
In contemporary metaphysics, one of the significant themes is that 
of fundamentalityi. The notion of fundamentality attempts to 
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formulate that which is primitive or basic about our reality. The 
predominant characterisation of fundamentality is in terms of 
ontological independence. It can be written as: 
Principle of Ontological Independence: x is fundamental if 
and only if there is no y such that x is dependent on it for its 
existence and identity. 
The above formulation can take different forms: absolute, relative 
and restricted fundamentality. Barring the few contemporary 
theories of fundamentality which preserve composites as 
significant inhabitants of their ontology, the prevalent 
understanding of the three forms of fundamentality posit ultimate 
independent entities from which the composites are derived. In a 
sense, the ontological significance of an entity is directly 
proportional to the extent of its ontological independence. 
The broad claim of fundamentality is that the explanation of that 
which is fundamental about our world would render a complete 
metaphysical picture of the world. Fundamentality usually takes 
the form of fundamental entities or a fundamental level of reality. 
Entities which are fundamental or which constitute the 
fundamental level of reality are ontologically independent and 
compose all other entities. This is the standpoint of object-oriented 
realism in contemporary metaphysics (Thalos, 2011). 
2. Object-Oriented Notion of Compositionality 
The relation between such fundamental entities and the composites 
is based on the notion of compositionality which treats wholes or 
composites as mereological sums of their parts. 
In classic extensional mereology, mereological sums or fusions or 
wholes are unstructured entities. Analogous to the axiom of 
extensionality in set theory, “the existence and identity of a 
mereological sum is determined exclusively on the basis of 
existence and identity of its parts; the arrangement or configuration 
of these parts is immaterial to the existence and identity of the sum 
they compose.” (Koslicki, 2017). In this sense, composites or wholes 
are ultimately ontologically subservient to the fundamental entities 
which compose them. Such subservience is reflected in the 
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treatment of composite entities simply as launching boards for 
discussions about fundamental entities. 
3. Fundamentality: In Physics and in Philosophy 
The representative of fundamental entities is generally considered 
to be elementary (subatomic) particles of contemporary physics, 
including quarks and leptons. However, this presupposes that the 
fundamentality in physics and in philosophy are similarly based. In 
physics, fundamentality is used interchangeably with elementary 
and refers to entities which do not have a substructure, that is, 
indivisible entities (Holden, 2004, p. 11; McGinn, 2011, p. 53). In 
philosophy, as mentioned above, fundamentality is defined in 
terms of ontological independence. Currently, this difference 
between the meaning of fundamentality in physics and philosophy 
has not been examined rigorously and there are no clear accounts 
of the relation between indivisibility and ontological independence. 
4. Conditionality of Existence 
One could conjecture that possible motivation for indivisible 
entities to be considered ontologically independent (and 
fundamental) is that the former does not have a structure or parts 
on which their identity or existence depends. However, such a 
motivation neglects the environmental conditions which 
elementary particles require to exist (Harrison, 2000, p. 427; Nave, 
2018; Kolb, 2018, p. 70). 
5. Structural and Relational Conditions of Existence 
A distinction between two kinds of conditions for the existence of 
an entity is made to provide more clarity: structural and relational. 
Structural conditions of existence are those ways that the 
components of an entity must be arranged in, in order to enable its 
origin and sustenance. Relational conditions of existence are those 
ways in which the environment enables its origin and sustenance. 
The fulfilment of structural conditions would enable the formation 
and sustenance of internal structure while the fulfilment of 
relational conditions would enable obtaining of relational 
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properties. Relational properties are those capacities that an entity 
possesses in order to respond to the changes in its environment. 
The internal structure enables and conditions the relational 
properties and vice-versa. Owing to limited space, this paper 
refrain from discussing this relationship in detail. It will suffice to 
point out that there are conditions for the existence of an entity and 
obtaining of such conditions enables the origin and development of 
its internal structure and its relational properties. 
6. Atoms, Us, the Earth, Universe and More 
There is overwhelming evidence to point to relational conditions of 
existence. This includes conditions for existence of atoms (Big Bang 
Nucleosynthesis (Petter, 2013, p. 76), conditions for existence of 
living organisations on Earth (molecular or chemical evolution of 
life (Davies, 2006), conditions for existence of communities (Turner 
& Maryanski, 2015; Knight, 2018; Runciman, 2001), conditions for 
existence of Earth (Smart, 2015; Schmidt & Lebedinsky, 2001), 
conditions for existence of Universe (Barrow, 2014) and so on. A 
more intuitive way of grasping the relational conditions is by 
considering counterfactual instances where one can engage with 
cases where the conditions are not met: suppose the temperatures 
on Earth had been different from as they were post-Big Bang and 
its effect on origin of atoms, if human beings did not possess the 
capacity to cooperate or inhibit their actions and its effect on origin 
of social groups, if an impact event had altered the way in which 
Solar System has developed and its effect on origin of Earth as a 
planet, if Big Bang had not happened. 
7. Violation of Principle of Ontological Independence 
Elementary particles do not have structural conditions for 
existence. However, they do have relational conditions for 
existence. If that is the case, then the Principle of Ontological 
Independence is violated. At this point, there are two options: 
either we accept that there are conditions of existence or that there 
are no conditions of existence. If there are conditions of existence 
and given that an ontologically independent being has no such 
conditions, we could move forward holding on to the idea of an 
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impossible existent and engage with it; to be fair, God does fulfil 
the criterion of ontologically independent being. If there are 
conditions of existence, then there can be proposals for a criterion 
of existence which would be inclusive of such conditionality. 
Consider the following principle: 
Principle of Conditionality of Existence (PCE)Df → To be is 
such that its possibility develops in obtaining of structural 
and relational conditions. 
Given such conditionality of existence, we can build a notion of 
compositionality that does justice to both the structural and 
relational conditions of existence. 
8. Wholes as Environments for Parts 
Before formulating the notion, I would like to note a significant 
point regarding the existence of quarks and other subatomic 
particles in our world today. The only conditions under which the 
quarks exist today is as parts of entities which have responded 
effectively to the changing environment. From the air which is 
composed of oxygen, nitrogen, carbon dioxide and argon 
molecules to the organisms composed of functional organ systems, 
quarks and other subatomic particles exist as constituents to 
composites. If anything, that we are all made of quarks and other 
elementary particles is a lesson in ontological dependence! 
Diversity in the kinds of organisations we encounter are attempts 
at responding to the environment, under changing set of 
conditions. 
It should be observed that the ontological consequence of claiming 
that the existence and identity of a whole depend on that of its 
parts. Given that the parts and the whole have varying conditions 
of existence, such a claim conflates these conditions. The pre-
existent mereological notion of compositionality fails to 
differentiate between a spectrum of environmental conditions. In 
the following section, this paper proposes a revised notion of 
compositionality, in terms of structural relatedness. 
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9. Compositionality in terms of Structural Relatedness 
Consider the following notion of compositionality: 
Compositionality in terms of Structural Relatedness (CSR): 
An existent x is a structure S composed of components [C1, 
C2, C3...Cn]: S {C1, C2, C3...Cn} such that x forms the 
environment (a set of conditions) within which the 
components can sustain their internal structure and 
relational properties. 
10. Structures and Coalescence 
The metaphysical picture of the world drawn with the revised 
notion of compositionality, along with the Principle of 
Conditionality of Existence is: The actual world is a continuous 
developing of existents, grasped as structures. There is a diverse 
variety of existents; such existents can be classified into different 
kinds. The existents have structural and relational conditions of 
existence. The obtaining of such conditions enables their origin and 
development. The set of conditions in which an existent is 
embedded is considered to be its environment and it forms the 
horizon of its sustenance. As environmental conditions change, the 
existents respondii. Such a response involves the sustenance of its 
internal structure. 
Coalescence is the ontological merging of an existent with other 
existents belonging to the same kind. Under such coalescence, the 
existent preserves its internal structure. However, the merge with 
the other existents alters its relational properties. It is the nature of 
coalescence that determines the furtherance or constraint on the 
relational properties of involved existents. Different kinds of 
wholes can be formed through such coalescence. Such wholes are 
characterised by their individual internal structure, non-
aggregative to structures of the existents which constitute it 
(Wimsatt, 2000). This is due to the relational efficacy of the 
coalescence. As environmental conditions change, such wholes can 
themselves become constituents to other wholes. In this way, 
reality consists of such continuous developing of a diverse range of 
wholes, interacting with the environment- which are sustaining 
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their internal structures and negotiating their relational properties 
through coalescence. 
The space for studying fundamentality through structural 
relatedness in contemporary metaphysics can be built through the 
justification of the ontological significance of different kinds of 
wholes. This can be done by understanding fundamentality as 
specific to levels of reality3 (De Haro, 2018). 
11. Conclusion 
The inclusion of conditionality of existence in the notion of 
fundamentality will provide a precise answer to the question of 
whether supposed ontologically independent entities can exhaust 
the metaphysical picture of our world. It will be a negative answer 
and the concept of compositionality in terms of structural 
relatedness is shown to be providing a fertile ground for justifying 
this inclusion.  
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Endnotes 
                                                          
i Refer to (Tahko, 2018) for an overview of concept of fundamentality. 
ii It is important to note that response does not presuppose agency. 
Consider the case of water turning into vapor: Suppose water is heated 
slowly in a container. The molecules in the water begin to move. Some 
of these molecules move faster than the others. After a point, the 
molecules move fast enough to break the hydrogen bonds which 
generally holds the water molecules together. This releases the 
individual molecules into the air. This process of evaporation is 
affected by many factors including humidity, air pressure and 
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temperature. In this example, there is no agency. Response is a series of 
changes which an existent realises in alignment with the difference in 
environment. Different kinds of wholes have varying response to 
environmental changes. Certain kinds of wholes also include the 
capacity to regulate their internal structure as a response. 
 
 
